Reply to Jacob Weisberg  (Washington Post February 10, 2008)
"Czech authorities originally suggested Atta had met with Iraqi intelligence, and
Epstein did the most to develop that -- in Slate, which Weisberg edits."

The Enemy in the GWOT (The New York Sun, February 7, 2008)
"During the Clinton years, groups became more important than states, words more
important than deeds — the ranting of some demented Islamic figure of more import
than a nuclear bomb."

Mystery of the WMDs (The American Spectator Online, January 29, 2008)
"These observations knock down two views embraced by Middle East experts after
the 1991 war that helped buttress Bill Clinton's do-nothing policy toward Iraq -- that
Saddam was "stupid" and that his foremost concern was his own survival and the
survival of his regime."

Unintelligence (The American Spectator Online, December 12, 2007)
The controversial National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program has finally
precipitated a discussion about the fallibility of U.S. intelligence.

What is Khalid Sheikh  Mohammed Saying?  (The American Spectator
, March 19, 2007
"When KSM was based in the Philippines, preparing the plot against U.S. airliners,
he and his co-conspirators had girlfriends and otherwise enjoyed Manila's decidedly
un-Islamic nightlife."
Letters on above

How Little We Know (The American Spectator, October 2006)
An alternative understanding of al Qaeda views it as the fruit of an opportunistic
alliance. After bin Laden was expelled from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996, two
groups joined forces -- either by merging or simply undertaking to cooperate.

Al Qaeda's Hidden Roots (The American Spectator Online, (Sept 20, 2006)
It would have been a truly massive failure of virtually every U.S. agency responsible
for fighting terrorism if bin Laden had backed a plot to kill 250,000 Americans in
1993, but the Justice Department only charged him with any crime five years later
and the intelligence community only began to analyze his organization the following

The Paper Trail  (The Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2006)
Most dramatically, an Iraqi intelligence report, apparently written in early 1997,
describes Iraqi efforts to establish ties with various elements in the Saudi
opposition, including Osama bin Laden.

February 26, 1993 (The New York Sun, January 13, 2006)
The Clinton administration's law enforcement approach to terrorism is now
recognized as fatally inadequate. Yet that approach, arguably, has left us with an
enduring misconception about the nature of the terrorist threat. Once the United
States began treating terrorism as a law enforcement issue, it came to be
understood as one.

Saddam's Terrorist Ties (The New York Sun, October 19, 2004)
The report of the Iraq Survey Group . . . includes the most comprehensive account of
the Iraqi Intelligence Service ever published in open-source literature, depicting an
organization that consisted of "over twenty compartmentalized directorates."
Section M-14 . . .  supervised the "Challenge Project," a highly secretive enterprise
involved with explosives, about which the Iraq Survey Group could learn little.  
Another section - M-21 - was formed in 1990 to create explosive devices for Iraqi
intelligence. Its chemistry department developed explosive materials; its electronics
department prepared timers and wiring; and its mechanical department produced
igniters and designed the bombs.

All in the Family?  (The New York Sun, June 24, 2004)
The Baluch are a distinct ethnic group, possessing their own
language and inhabiting a specific territory, although they have no
state. America has virtually nothing to do with the Baluch. The
Baluch have no evident motive for these stupendously murderous
assaults against America -- save one.

“Don’t Look at Me” --  Dick Clarke’s reversed reality (National Review
, April 5, 2004)
Clarke's book, Against All Enemies is, essentially, an attempt to blame the Bush
administration for 9/11, while exonerating Clinton (and therefore Clarke). The reality
is quite the reverse.

Very Awkward Facts (The Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2004)
When Mr. Clarke reported, six days after the 9/11 strikes, that no evidence existed
linking them to Iraq, or Iraq to al Qaeda, he was reiterating the position he and
others had taken throughout the Clinton years. They systematically turned a blind
eye to such evidence and failed to pursue leads that might result in a conclusion of
Iraqi culpability.

Mishandling Terrorism:  the Law-Enforcement Mistake (National
Review Online
, January 23, 2004)
After 9/11, it took authorities six months to learn that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
(who is supposedly Yousef's uncle) was the mastermind of those dreadful assaults.
And that information came from the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah — information
that would been unavailable if, following his capture, Abu Zubaydah had been
arrested and read his Miranda rights, as regularly happened in the Clinton years.

The Baluch Connection: Is Khalid Sheikh Mohammed tied to
Baghdad? (The Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2003)
Why should the Baluch seek to kill Americans? . . . The U.S. has little
to do with them; there is no evident motive for this murderous obsession.
The Baluch do, however, have longstanding ties to Iraqi intelligence."

Caution that post-Saddam Iraq not clearly thought through
(London Times, March 2, 2003)
It is very late in the day and there are still splits between the Pentagon and the
State Department

How Terror Investigations Can Go Awry  (The Wall Street Journal,
December 26, 2001)
The FBI has learned very little in its investigation. Virtually all that it has determined
is that the anthrax was the Ames strain, created in the U.S. decades ago and used
by some U.S. labs. Yet other countries have that strain and Iraq made a determined
effort to obtain it. There is no reason to believe the anthrax came from a U.S. lab, as
opposed to a foreign one, particularly Iraq.

Was Bin Laden working with Iraq?  (Boston Globe, September 25, 2001)
If Iraq was involved in this month's terrorist assaults, might Saddam actually want
the United States to fight bin Laden? Once the battle in Afghanistan commences,
and if another terrible terrorist assault occurs, won't we interpret it in that context?

The Iraqi Connection:  Did Osama bin Laden act alone? Not likely
The Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2001)
[A]l Qaeda's demonstrated ties to Sudanese intelligence raise another question.
Iraq has close ties to Sudan. Sudan supported Iraq during the Gulf War and
subsequently established Khartoum as a major center for Iraqi intelligence. Abd al
Samad al-Ta'ish, a highly placed Iraqi intelligence agent, was Iraq's ambassador to
Khartoum until the summer of 1998. Al-Ta'ish arrived in Khartoum in July 1991 with
35 other intelligence officers to establish a base for Iraqi operations in the wake of
the upheaval wrought by the Gulf War.

The Folly of Giving Way to Saddam (Review of Richard Butler's The
Greatest Threat
)  (Boston Globe, October 12, 2000)
Richard Butler's book tells the story of the final 18 months and eventual demise of
UNSCOM, the organization of international weapons inspectors created after the
1991 Gulf War and charged with destroying what remained of Iraq's unconventional
armaments program.

Stop Ignoring Saddam (Jerusalem Post, August 17, 1999)
[L]ast week, the Barak government publicly revealed its concerns about the Iraqi
danger. Its outspokenness stands in marked contrast to the Netanyahu
government, which was strangely reticent about the Saddam menace.

The Method to Saddam's Madness (Washington Times, January 13, 1999)
Among the possibilities is unconventional terrorism. If, for example, there were an
unconventional terrorist attack against a U.S. target the Clinton administration might
well blame Osama bin Ladin, or some other fundamentalists. That would be
particularly likely, if the attack were run as a "false flag" operation, with some minor
figures set up to be arrested

And Why It Matters (The National Interest, Winter,
[Abdul Rahman Yasin] is reported to have been extremely cool, as a
trained intelligence agent would be. He was helpful to [FBI]
investigators who themselves faced tremendous pressure to
produce answers. He told them, for instance, the location of the
apartment that was used to make the bomb, a key bit of
information. They thanked him for his cooperation and let him walk
out. This, although he had arrived just six months before from Iraq,
and might well attempt to return there. And indeed, the very next
day, Abdul Rahman Yasin boarded Royal Jordanian 262 to Amman,
the same plane Salameh had hoped to catch. From Amman he went
on to Baghdad. An ABC news stringer saw him there last year,
outside his father's house, and learned from neighbors that he
worked for the Iraqi government.

Saddam's Germs (with James Ring Adams)
The American Spectator, November 1995

Saddam and Terrorism: The WTC Bombing
Newsweek, October 17, 1994

Iraq's New Reign of Terror
New York Times, October 2, 1994

Kurdistan:  After Saddam Hussein
Atlantic Monthly, December 1992

Iraq's Real Coup:  Did Saddam Snooker Schwarzkopf?
Washington Post, June 28, 1992

Billions for Iraq, Not A Penny for Saddam
Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1991

Help the Iraqi Resistance
Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1991

We Should Mind Iraq's Business
New York Times, March 7, 1991

Saddam's Palestinians
Wall Street Journal, October 12, 1990
From the Archive

Who is Ramzi Yousef?  The
National Interest
, Winter,

Response to this article:

New York Post Editorial (1-22-1996)
"An important article by Middle East
expert Laurie Mylroie . . . [suggests] that
the strategy the U.S. is using to combat
terror may not be adequate to ensure
American security."

Washington Monthly Journalism Award
"Mylroie . . . found that lack of
coordination between the Justice
Department and national security
agencies means that national security
gets short shrift in dealing with domestic

Amb. Charles Lichenstein

Dr. Geoffrey Kemp
by Laurie Mylroie
KSM (l) Ramzi Yousef (r) and
Ammar al Baluchi (below)
Amb. Richard Butler--second,
and last, UNSCOM chairman

Charlie Rose show
October 10, 1994

Charlie Rose show
January 30, 2002